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When China acceded to WTO in 2001, there were fears that Chinese firms would lose market share 
in key sectors to foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs).  Although aggregate data often indicate a shift 
in favour of FIEs, indigenous firms in many cases have slowly increased market share and deepened 
their technical capabilities.  Through an analysis of aggregate data and three sectors, we show how 
the dynamics of competition between Chinese and FIEs in China’s domestic market enhance the 
upgrading prospects for Chinese firms.  China represents a new model of development in several 
important respects:  industrial upgrading efforts are often domestically-driven, within this domestic 
market there is intense competition between both domestic and foreign firms, and this competition 
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China represents a new model of development in several important respects:  industrial 
upgrading efforts are often domestically-driven, within this domestic market there is intense 
competition between both domestic and foreign firms, and this competition is driving and 
stimulating the upgrading efforts of domestic firms.   
Although exports have been critical to China’s growth, a key dimension of the 
upgrading process lies in the interaction between domestic firms and foreign-invested 
enterprises (FIEs) that are largely competing in China’s domestic market, a market that for 
some key sectors has grown four to five folds in the last decade.  Unlike smaller developing 
countries, the huge size of the Chinese market has provided ample room for entry and 
expansion in many sectors without the need for domestic firms to immediately launch 
themselves into global markets.  Unlike countries that exploited large and protected markets 
before shifting outward, China has been much more open to foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and become tightly integrated with the global economy.  Within the domestic Chinese market, 
intense competition—a product of the lower tariff barriers and entry by both foreign-invested 
and domestic firms leading up to and following China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO)—has raised the threshold level of capability that domestic firms must 
achieve in order to survive and has forced foreign firms to localize activities in order to cut 
costs.  This competitive pressure expands and deepens the channels through which Chinese 
firms can build and upgrade their capabilities.   
Industrial upgrading was not a widely anticipated outcome of WTO accession.  During 
the first two decades of the reform period, China’s central government struggled to tilt the 
terms of competition within the domestic marketplace in favor of indigenous Chinese firms.  
High tariff barriers shielded the market from global competition; foreign firms that sought 
access to the domestic market were pushed to transfer technology to Chinese partners, and strict 
domestic content requirements were the norm in many sectors.  When China finally acceded to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, some policymakers in Beijing feared that 
liberalization was happening too quickly.  Chinese firms were not yet prepared for the rigors of   2
global competition and the critics of the accession agreement feared that as tariff barriers fell, 
domestic Chinese firms would rapidly lose market share to their global competitors.   
  In this paper we argue that the worst of these initial fears were not realized. Following 
entry into WTO, market competition increased significantly, and overall, Chinese firms lost 
market share.  However, indigenous firms gained market share in many sectors, and even where 
they lost, they have often deepened their capabilities in the course of making the transition into 
higher value-added parts of the value chain.  We provide evidence of this success, and offer an 
explanation for it. 
  The argument is at three levels—the aggregate level of the entire Chinese domestic 
market, the level of individual sectors, and the value chains within these sectors—and the type 
of data we utilize varies by level.  As a first step, we analyze estimates for the entire Chinese 
domestic market constructed on the basis of data from China’s industrial census and trade 
statistics in order to assess trends in the relative market share of domestic firms, FIEs, and 
imports over time.
1  The aggregate data indicate an increase in the market share of foreign firms 
over the period spanning China’s WTO accession.  There are many sectors where domestic 
firms increased market share, but in the aggregate, these gains are offset by those sectors in 
which domestic firms lost ground.  
   In a second step, we analyze data for three sectors in which it appears that domestic 
firms lost market share after WTO accession—presumably the hard cases to show evidence of 
domestic upgrading—and argue that the aggregate data mask significant upgrading within the 
sectors.  When these sectors are broken down by market segment, analysis at the OEM (original 
equipment manufacturer) level, i.e. firms producing final products, makes clear that domestic 
firms dominate at the low-end of the market, where consumers are relatively indifferent to 
quality and firms compete on the basis of price, and foreign firms dominate at the high-end, 
where consumers are less sensitive to price and quality is critical.  Moreover, significant barriers 
to entry prevent each from easily encroaching on the share of the other:  domestic firms rarely 
have the deep know-how to design, manufacture and market products to compete with foreign 
firms in the high-end and foreign firms are rarely able to meet the price points demanded by 
consumers in the low-end of the market.  We provide evidence, however, that domestic firms   3
are increasingly capable of competing with foreign firms for the middle of the market, which is 
becoming the largest and most rapidly growing segment within these industrial sectors.   
It is the fight for the middle that deepens the channels of upgrading for domestic firms 
in China:  domestic firms strive to upgrade their product through improvement in design and 
manufacturing methods in order to escape the intense competition at the bottom while foreign 
firms seek to decrease costs in order to capture the rapidly growing market segments in the 
middle.  The supply chain plays a central role.  The cost-cutting efforts of foreign assembly 
firms lead them to localize their operations more aggressively than would otherwise be the 
case, and their localization efforts provide a new range of upgrading opportunities for Chinese 
supply firms.  The upgrading efforts of domestic assembly firms lead them to seek out the most 
capable domestic suppliers in order to draw upon the combination of low-cost and strong 
manufacturing capabilities.  Although we do not have systematic evidence of this dynamic (i.e. 
a comprehensive sector-wide benchmarking study), we supplement data from industrial 
yearbooks and other sources with information that was collected during extensive visits with 
leading firms (both assemblers and suppliers) in each of the three sectors. This allows us to 
provide illustrative examples of the localization and upgrading dynamics of key components in 
each sector.   
In the first section of the paper we place our argument in the context of two of the 
dominant approaches to industrial upgrading in East Asia.  In the second section we analyze the 
dynamics of competition in the Chinese domestic market at an aggregate level and explain why 
a more fine-grained analysis is necessary.  Each subsequent section analyzes a particular market 
segment, namely, the bottom, the top, and the middle. 
 
1.  FROM EXPORT-LED GROWTH TO DOMESTIC-LED UPGRADING 
 
An outward orientation has been a crucial element of the East Asia developmental 
model, and the primary theoretical frameworks for understanding industrial upgrading have 
focused on how governments and firms prepare for competition in global markets.     4
One of the most influential frameworks is that of the developmental state.  As 
Alexander Gerschenkron argued in his classic study of late 19th century industrial development 
in Germany, the institutions of the state must assist industries that are technology and capital 
intensive in their efforts to acquire the most advanced technology (1962:  83).  The most 
influential explanations of rapid growth in East Asia follow closely from Gerschenkron’s 
logic.
2 Japan (Johnson 1982) and Korea (Amsden 1989; Kohli 2004)  provide classic examples 
of an elite and coherent bureaucracy working closely with private business to formulate and 
implement a strategic development policy.  Large business groups were granted protection and 
preferential access to capital by the state, which they leveraged in the domestic market to build 
capabilities, diversify into a broad range of industrial capabilities, and prepare for an outward 
push into global markets.  Within the domestic markets there was competition, but it was 
overwhelmingly between domestic firms:  FDI was limited and the preferred means of 
acquiring foreign technology was through licensing agreements and technical cooperation 
agreements.
3  Scale and scope were critical to this model.  They translated into cost savings 
(due to fuller capacity utilization and lower sourcing costs), allowed for more learning-by-
doing, and made it possible to spread the fixed cost of design and manufacturing over larger 
output volumes (Amsden and Chu 2003:  7).  From a conceptual perspective a developmental 
state did not have to transition from domestic to export-led growth, however an export push on 
the part of national firms allowed for higher volumes, particularly for relatively small 
economies such as Korea and Taiwan, and allowed the government bureaucracy to evaluate the 
success of sectoral interventions according to export performance (World Bank 1993:  22-23; 
Woo-Cumings 1999:  12).  
It is not our objective to outline in detail the manner in which China does and does not 
follow in the tradition of a developmental state; suffice it to say that there are elements of both.  
The critical difference from our perspective, however, is that China combines both a very large 
domestic market with a high level of FDI that is focused on this domestic market.   There have 
been large domestic markets in the past (Japan) and there been states that have relied on FDI 
(Singapore, and to a lesser extent Taiwan), but the combination of the two has been rare.  
Foreign firms investing in China face a variety of restrictions, and in some sectors they are   5
more severe than others, but the high level of FDI means that even when a certain industry 
benefits from a relatively low level of import competition, the domestic firms in the industry 
must face significant competition from foreign firms that are operating in China.  Indeed, some 
scholars have argued that the system is systematically biased in favor of foreign firms (Huang 
2003).
4  Although many foreign firms in China are engaged in export processing, a majority of 
FDI is focused on the domestic market.  In addition to the competition fostered by FDI, China 
is far more open than its neighbors were at comparable levels of development.  This is 
particularly true after WTO accession, but according to Branstetter and Lardy (2008:  635), 
even prior to WTO accession the height of formal tariff barriers was sometimes deceptive.
5   
The high levels of FDI in China point to a larger trend:  the globalization of production. 
Although there is nothing new about international production, the degree of fragmentation 
between firms within a value chain and across national borders has increased as a result of the 
liberalization of trading regimes, reductions in transport and communication costs, and the 
ability to codify design information in digital form.  One indication of this trend is the growth 
of trade in intermediate goods rather than finished goods.  In the world of a developmental 
state, government and business leaders attempt to use industrial policy to support the 
development of integrated product manufacturers; in a world of global production, “the mosaic 
of specialization and intermediate goods flows that make up distributed production systems and 
global value chains (GVCs) means that domestic capabilities and development cannot easily be 
… linked to domestic sources (Whittaker, Zhu, Sturgeon et al. forthcoming:  11).”  The 
challenge is to control the parts of the value chain that are most profitable and maximize the 
benefits of participating in global production chains. 
A second theoretical approach to industrial upgrading analyzes how participation in 
GVCs facilitates industrial upgrading among exporting firms in a developing economy, and has 
provided crucial insights into how the form of interaction with the global economy shapes the 
range of possibilities for developing countries (Bair 2005:  156).  One of the core hypotheses of 
the value chain literature is that participation in GVCs creates the potential for industrial 
upgrading because knowledge flows through the chain (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002:  1020).  
Scholars take a variety of views on how large the potential for upgrading actually is (Gereffi   6
1999; Humphrey and Schmitz 2002).
6  The assumption in all cases, however, is that global 
markets are the objective, and this assumption skews the playing field to the advantage of 
global firms in either buyer-driven or producer-driven chains.  In a buyer-driven chain, the core 
competencies of lead firms are marketing, sales, and retail.  Firms in developing countries 
understand local markets best, and an export-oriented firm from a developing country is 
naturally going to find it difficult to develop brands for a foreign market.  In a producer-driven 
chain, the core competencies of lead firms are technology and design, and firms from 
developing countries are generally weak in both.  As Steinfeld (2004) has argued, Chinese 
firms are extensively involved in production for overseas markets but they are stuck in 
commodity manufacturing and undifferentiated activities that have low-value added.   
This brings us to the central question of this paper:  what if the primary markets are 
domestic rather than foreign?  Within the value chain literature, there are scholars who have 
emphasized the benefits of focusing on multiple markets and participating in multiple value 
chains ((Lee and Chen 2000; Bazan and Navas-Aleman 2004; Navas-Aleman and Bazan 2005).  
Because the organization of the chains varies widely, each offers different opportunities for 
domestic firms.  A focus on domestic markets leads manufacturing firms to broaden the scope 
of their activities (i.e. functional upgrading) into design, marketing, and branding.  This may be 
because they have a better understanding of home markets than foreign markets, or it may be 
because domestic customers are not as powerful or concentrated as their counterparts in global 
value chains.  Participation in multiple value chains provides the possibility of “leveraging 
competencies”:  different value chains create different possibilities for learning, and what is 
learned in one value chain can be applied in others (Lee and Chen 2000).   
Our focus has similarities with this research, but there are important differences.  The 
most important is the scale of the Chinese market, and the extent to which it becomes a focus 
not only for domestic Chinese firms, but also for multinational firms.  It is not simply that 
Chinese firms are able to focus on the domestic market (in addition to their participation in 
global value chains); it is that foreign firms are doing the same.  If the competitive playing field 
is tilted in favour of multinational firms when the market focus is advanced economies, perhaps 
the playing field tilts back to a level position when the focus is a developing economy.  Both   7
the domestic and the foreign firms face their challenges—domestic firms struggle to upgrade 
their product through design and quality improvements in order to escape the intense 
competition at the low-end of the market, and foreign firms struggle to decrease costs (without 
sacrificing quality to the extent that the company brand is damaged) in order to capture the 
rapidly growing market segments in the middle of the market—and the interaction of these two 
dynamics gives rise to a new set of opportunities and challenges for a firm that is seeking to 
upgrade.  The result is quite different from the dynamic described by either the developmental 
state literature or the global value chain literature. 
In the business literature there is a growing awareness of the importance of the Chinese 
domestic market, and the manner in which Chinese firms utilize this market to hone the skills 
that they need to compete with multinational firms.  Gadiesh, Leung, and Vestring (2007), in 
particular, describe the rise of the “good enough” market in China, which is essentially the mid-
market segment, and provide excellent insight into the business strategy of domestic and 
foreign firms that are competing for this segment in China.  Zeng and Williamson (2007) focus 
on how Chinese companies are able to operate at lower costs than their foreign competitors, and 
how their low-cost advantage allows them to move upmarket; an increasing number of authors 
analyze how the rising importance of emerging markets is shaping the the design activities and 
organizational structure of multinational firms (Brown and Hagel 2005; Immelt, Govindarajan 
and Trimble 2009).   The purpose of these authors is neither to provide a systematic argument 
about the Chinese economy nor to explain why some Chinese sectors (and some firms within 
these sectors) have a greater potential for upgrading than others.  They seek to describe 
company strategies in a key global market.  Building on the insights of these works, we seek to 
provide a comprehensive view of market segmentation in China and a deeper understanding of 
why some domestic firms are better positioned to take advantage of it than others.   
 
2.  CHINA’S DOMESTIC MARKET:  RAPID GROWTH, BUT WHO BENEFITS? 
 
Since the onset of economic reform, growth in China’s manufacturing sector has 
averaged more than 15% per annum in real terms.  There is little consensus about what is   8
driving this growth and what types of firms are benefiting.  Reflecting the rapid increase of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into China and exports out of China, foreign firms and 
foreign trade often figure prominently in these discussions (Rodrik 1999).  Some scholars stress 
the advantages that policy-makers have given to FIEs (Huang 2003) and the continued 
weakness of domestic firms (Steinfeld 2004).  However, others emphasize the growing strength 
of Chinese firms (Gadiesh, Leung et al. 2007; Zeng and Williamson 2007). Surprisingly, there 
have been few attempts to systematically assess the relative market share of Chinese, FIEs, and 
imports in the China’s domestic market and the trend over time.   
The challenge at the aggregate (and sector) level is determining the overall size of the 
domestic marketplace in China, the type of firm that is filling the domestic demand (domestic 
firms, FIEs, or imports), and the trend over time. These questions are difficult to answer because 
of the need for sector-level data on manufacturing output and exports by firm ownership, in 
addition to sector-level data on imports. We utilize here a combination of firm-level output data 
from the Chinese Industrial Census in 1995 and 2004 and trade data to provide estimates at the 
4-digit CIC (Chinese Industrial Classification) level of the size and growth of the domestic 
market.
7  The value of using the census years is that the data include all manufacturing firms in 
China.
 The domestic market is defined as total output of all firms producing in China less 
exports plus imports.  Sales of Chinese firms and FIEs going to the domestic market, on the 
other hand, are their total sales less exports.   
Table 1 provides a summary picture for two manufacturing census years, 1995 and 
2004.  In 1995, the total value of sales (domestic plus exports) of all firms manufacturing in 
China was 5.44 trillion RMB. Exports represented slightly more than 20%—with the bulk of the 
output produced by these firms sold domestically.  Total sales to the domestic market from all 
three sources (domestic firms, FIEs, and imports) were 5.43 trillion RMB.  Chinese firms 
captured slightly less than two-thirds of domestic demand, with imports and sales of FIEs 
making up the rest.  Compared to the sales of FIEs that were directed to the domestic market, 
Chinese firms had 85.7 percent of the market. 
 
Insert Table 1 here   9
 
 As a consequence of the rapid economic growth between 1995 and 2004, the domestic 
market expanded to 19.36 billion. Total sales of manufacturing firms in China grew almost as 
rapidly to 18.52 trillion. Over this period, exports grew most rapidly, and increased as a share of 
total manufacturing output to 28.0 percent.  But sales to the domestic market still represented 72 
percent of the output of firms manufacturing in China. For foreign firms, 58 percent of sales 
were to the domestic market, down slightly from 63 percent in 1995. By 2004, Chinese firms 
had seen their share of the domestic market slip from 67.7 to 56.0 percent. Much of this loss 
was to FIEs, whose share of the domestic market rose from 11.3 percent of output in 1995 to 
19.1 percent in 2004, an increase of seventy percent.  The share of imports rose less 
dramatically from 21.0 to 24.9 percent.  Through 2004, this evidence appears to support the 
argument that the Chinese market is gradually being conquered by FIEs.     
  We must be careful in interpreting these data. These data are only for two points in 
time, and thus, they may miss either a slowing down in the trend, or possibly even a reversal.  
We cannot replicate the estimates for 1995 and 2004 for other years, given that the census is 
only undertaken once every decade, but we are able to construct estimates of the respective 
share of domestic and foreign firms in the domestic market exclusive of the role of imports.  
These estimates draw on National Bureau of Statistics annual firm-level data that include all 
state-owned enterprises, in addition to all other firms with annual sales greater than 5 million 
RMB.  Sales of these firms have consistently represented 90 percent of total sales of all firms 
manufacturing in China.  These data suggest that the decline in the market share of Chinese 
firms was much less between 2001 and 2007 (73.7 percent to 70.1) than it was between 1995 
and 2001 (79.8 to 73.9). Moreover, the market share of Chinese firms began to rise again in 
2006. 
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
Aggregate figures can be misleading for two other important reasons.  First, they 
obscure enormous heterogeneity among the more than four hundred 4-digit manufacturing   10
sectors.  Figure 1 graphs the percentage of the domestic market captured by each of the three 
sources (Chinese firms, foreign firms, and imports) in these sectors in 1995.  Each dot 
represents a complete sector.  There are sectors in which Chinese firms had almost all of the 
market (point A), and a few sectors primarily served by either imports or FIEs (points B and C) 
operating in China, but as a general rule, the domestic market was served by both domestic and 
foreign firms.
8  As we will explain, imports typically serve the highest end of the market, 
followed by FIEs and then Chinese firms serving the bulk of the market.  Figure 2 provides the 
histogram for the change in the market share of domestic firms in these sectors between 1995 
and 2004.  Overall, domestic Chinese firms lose market share, but there are pronounced changes 
in both directions.   
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
Our purpose in this paper is not to explain these differences, but there are a few things 
that we can say based on results (not reported here) from simple regressions of the change in 
market shares on product and sector characteristics in the mid-1990s.  As might be expected, the 
sectors in which Chinese firms are doing especially well appear to be concentrated among more 
labor-intensive sectors in which manufacturing requirements may not have been especially high, 
and China was able to take advantage of its comparative advantage in low cost labor.  
Conversely, foreign firms were especially successful in expanding market share in those sectors 
in which some combination of technology, capital-intensity, manufacturing know-how, 
branding and marketing were more important.  This should not be totally surprising in light of 
China’s expressed policy of trading market for technology.  In key sectors, import tariffs were 
initially set relatively high in order to encourage foreign firms to invest and build plants in 
China—often as part of a JV—and transfer technology and know-how in the process.  Figure 3 
provides representative examples of sectors in which domestic firms gained and lost market 
share, usually to FIEs, between 1995 and 2004. 
 
Insert Figure 3 here   11
 
 A focus on heterogeneity between sectors is useful, but even this is not fine-grained 
enough.  A second level of detail that is necessary is heterogeneity within sectors.  Even in 
sectors in which Chinese firms have seen their overall market share decline, they may still be 
having success in a small but possibly rising number of market segments that portends well for 
the future.  It is also important to keep in mind that in light of the rapid growth in the size of the 
domestic market, a reduction in market share can still be consistent with a respectable growth in 
sales. This kind of heterogeneity can only be revealed by a much more in-depth examination of 
such sectors, one that carefully dissects market segments within these sectors.   
We define market segments according to the quality and sophistication of a product 
(roughly following Gadiesh, Leung et al. 2007).  Product quality is measured primarily in terms 
of reliability and durability.  The measure of product sophistication varies by sector (and is not 
always precise), but refers to the range of functions and/or the complexity of the technology in a 
product.  Quality and sophistication will sometimes co-vary, but not always.   Figure 4 uses the 
construction equipment industry to illustrate the range of market segments that are possible 
within a sector:  the highest-end segment (and the one with the most expensive products) is the 
box in the upper right corner and the lowest-end segment (with the least expensive products) is 
the box in the lower left corner.  A firm is able to move into a higher-end segment by either 
improving the quality of a wheel-loader (a relatively unsophisticated product) or moving into a 
more sophisticated product range (low-end excavator).  The manufacturing requirements within 
the segments of an industry can vary as widely as the requirements between sectors.   
 
Insert Figure 4 here 
 
In order to provide a more disaggregated analysis of Chinese capability building that we 
believe to be necessary, we have selected three sectors: construction equipment, computer 
numerically-controlled (CNC) machine tools, and automotive.  We selected these sectors for 
several reasons.  First, and most importantly, these are sectors where aggregate numbers would 
lead us to believe that Chinese firms were increasingly losing out to FIEs.   Recall that Chinese   12
firms lost domestic market share in more than half of all sectors.  Second, although our broader 
research agenda seeks to explain how the characteristics of a sector affect the upgrading 
potential for indigenous firms, in this paper we chose sectors with roughly similar 
characteristics. All three sectors can be described as mature and capital-intensive with relatively 
slow product cycles.  With possibly the exception of the auto sector in Taiwan, all three sectors 
were important in the industrial development of Japan, Korea and Taiwan.  Finally, these three 
sectors are quantitatively important ones within both the Chinese and the global economy.  In 
each of these three sectors, the Chinese domestic market is either the largest or next to largest in 
the world.   
In the bottom half of Table 1, we provide a breakdown for these sectors that is 
analogous to the aggregate level.
9  In 1995, the share of domestic firms was largest in 
construction equipment, followed by vehicles and then machine tools.  Between 1995 and 2004, 
domestic firms in vehicles lost the most market share, followed by domestic construction firms, 
and then machine tools.  To help put these reductions in perspective, we observe a reduction at 
least as great as that in vehicles in 10 percent of all sectors, and 25 percent in the case of 
construction. In both sectors there is a significant increase in the role of FIEs selling in China, 
and this increase comes largely at the expense of the share of the market captured by domestic 
firms.  In machine tools, the expansion of the FIEs is more modest.    
In short, in all three cases it appears that the position of FIEs is strengthening over time 
and that of domestic firms weakening, a trend that mirrors the general situation for Chinese 
industry.  This assessment is too pessimistic, as we will see when we look at each of these 
sectors in more detail.  
 
3.  THE BATTLE AT THE BOTTOM 
 
The low-end segment provides a crucial initial stepping stone for indigenous Chinese 
firms.  Intrinsic in much of the development literature is the idea that the gap between the 
expectations of export markets and the capabilities of indigenous firms is too wide to bridge.  
Building on Hobday, for example, Hubert Schmitz (2007) argues that late-comer firms face two   13
primary problems when they attempt to integrate with the global economy:  a “technology gap” 
and a “marketing gap.”  The technology gap is a result of being cut-off from international 
sources of technology (and in particular the feedback loop between users and producers that 
spurs innovation), the difficulty of accessing proprietary technology, and weak national and/or 
local support for innovation.  These technologies may include the “hard” technologies that are 
embodied in production machinery and product designs or “soft” managements systems such as 
quality control or supply chain management.  “The technology gap,” according to Schmitz 
(2007:  421), “is lower in mature industries where technological requirements are well 
understood and change slowly.”  The marketing gap is a result of the difficulty a firm will have 
understanding and responding to rapidly changing consumer demand when it is disconnected 
from the market.  It is exacerbated by highly concentrated retail sectors (which shifts leverage 
within the value chain to the buyer) and the capital intensity of developing a brand.  The 
combination of the technology and the marketing gap creates a barrier that firms in developing 
countries must overcome if they are to succeed in export markets.   Too wide a technology gap 
also prevents a firm from benefiting from absorbing the knowledge and technology spillovers 
that may result from FDI (Crespo and Fontoura 2007:  413).   
When a developing country firm is focused on its own domestic market, the upgrading 
dynamic is potentially very different.  In its home market, the “technology gap” confronting a 
local firm is smaller because lower average income levels lead a large portion of the market to 
prioritize price rather than technical sophistication.  As a result, the technical demands of the 
products within the sector are within the range of domestic firm’s manufacturing capabilities:  
the designs for mature products are more accessible (either through copying or licensing) and 
the manufacturing processes are not highly demanding and/or are processes with which 
domestic firms have more experience.
10  These products are in contrast to those that might be 
demanded by export markets, products that require very high levels of manufacturing capability 
(i.e. to achieve a certain level of quality and consistency), and designs and technologies that are 
proprietary.  Similarly, the “marketing gap” that indigenous firms face when exporting to 
advanced industrial countries will largely disappear when they focus on their domestic market.  
There is the possibility that foreign firms with powerful brands will continue to have an   14
advantage, but domestic firms will be better attuned to consumer preferences.  In fact, there is a 
strong possibility that it is a foreign firm that will face a “marketing gap” (at least initially), 
particularly when the developing country is only a small portion of their overall portfolio.  
These firms will also likely be handicapped by a weaker sales and distribution networks. 
In each of the three sectors that we analyzed in China, a similar pattern is evident.  
First, there is a decade prior to WTO accession when domestic firms are able to master the 
manufacturing processes for relatively mature products in the sectors.  Government support and 
protection is often significant during this period (although the extent varies by sector).  Second, 
there is extremely rapid growth of the low-end segments towards the end of the 1990s, which 
has invited rapid entry and intense competition. Nonetheless, the low-end segments are 
dominated by domestic firms.   Third, despite overall fragmentation and continued competition 
for the low-end of the market, leading firms take advantage of their success in low-end 




Until the end of the 1990s, competition in the Chinese auto sector was leisurely and the 
degree of segmentation in the market was limited.  Efforts to develop capabilities in passenger 
vehicles focused on joint ventures (JVs) with foreign firms during the 1980s and most of the 
1990s, and the market consisted of institutional customers (i.e.  state-owned enterprises and 
agencies).
11  Despite pressure from the Chinese government, few of the foreign partners in the 
JVs were willing to bring their most recent technology to China.  Volkswagen was the market 
leader, and by the mid-1990s it controlled over 50% of the market with a model based on 1970s 
technology.  In many respects, this was exactly what domestic firms needed:  the capabilities 
that were being developed throughout the supply base as a result of government localization 
requirements were in line with the initial level of the manufacturing capabilities of Chinese 
firms and the slow rate of product change gave them the time to master the required 
manufacturing processes.  The primary complaint of the central government was that there were 
few independent domestic brands that could compete with the foreign-invested joint ventures   15
products.  By the late 1990s, slightly more than half a million passenger cars were being 
produced in China and five out of six of these were being produced by FIEs.
12 
The characteristics of the market changed rapidly at the end of the 1990s.  First, tariffs 
for small vehicles (1.6 liters or less) decreased from 80% in 1998 to 25% in 2006, and from an 
even higher base for larger cars.  Tariffs on parts and components were always lower, but they 
too fell from 20-25% to an average of 10% in 2006.  Second, tariff reduction was 
complemented by enormous capacity expansion in the industry, both in the form of new entry 
from foreign multinationals and domestic firms, and also expansion by incumbents. By 2007, 
capacity in passenger vehicles was more than 9 million units, and nearly 7 million cars were 
assembled in China.  Third, the domestic market shifted from one that was dominated by 
institutional buyers, who were relatively insensitive to price (and often had a politically-
motivated regional bias), to one that is dominated by individual buyers who are extremely 
sensitive to price and value.  The result of these changes was intense competition within the 
sector.   As we will show below, prices decreased dramatically at the same time that car quality 
improved.   
 
Insert Figure 5 here 
 
A far more segmented market began to develop after the late-1990s.  In Figure 5, we 
provide a breakdown of production by six market segments for the FIEs and Chinese firms for 
2000 and 2006.
13  In the Chinese auto market, quality and sophistication of products tend to co-
vary with size—small and mini cars tend to be of lower quality—and we measure size 
according to engine displacement.
14  In 2000, the largest market segment was upper medium, to 
which only JVs sold cars. Included in this market segment were vehicles such as the VW 
Santana, Audi A4, GM Buick, etc.  With the exception of a small amount of production aimed 
for the luxury market, Chinese car manufacturers were heavily concentrated in the production of 
small or mini cars, in which they had most of the market.   By 2006, the center of gravity in the 
Chinese market had clearly shifted to less expensive cars.  The fastest growth was in the lower-
medium segment, in which car production totaled 1.25 million vehicles.  Small car production   16
was just shy of a million units. Combined, these two segments represented half of all 
production, up from slightly less than a third in 2000. And in both of these segments, Chinese 
firms did well in face of significant competition and entry of new models from the JVs.   
 
Insert Figure 6 here 
 
Figure 6 provides a summary of the number of new models that were introduced by car 
segment. Although Chinese OEMs lost share in the small car market as models such as the GM 
Sail and Honda Fit were successfully introduced, these firms increased their share in the lower-
medium market. In two car segments catering to higher-income buyers, namely, SUVs and 
minivans, Chinese firms also did well, but quantitatively, it was their success in the lower-
medium market that explains their rising market share over this period.   
 
Insert Figure 6 
 
By 2007, the domestic market share of Chinese auto manufacturers in terms of units 
sold had increased to 30.3 percent, and firms such as BYD, Chery, and Geely were dominating 
the low-end of the market.  A common explanation of this success emphasizes IPR violations, 
but this was only part of the story.  Independent domestic firms were more flexible because, 
unlike the foreign firms, they were not selling products that were designed for developed (and 
high-cost) markets.  Their primary focus was the Chinese marketplace and this created several 
advantages over foreign competitors.  First, the domestic firms did not have to seek the 
approval of a global headquarters to certify new suppliers or launch new models, and when 
market demand shifted, they were able to respond quickly.  Second, because their products 
were designed specifically for the low-end of the domestic market, the designs were based on a 
“good-enough” standard, which allowed them to increase the use of low-cost suppliers (as 
opposed to the global suppliers that supported the JVs).  Figure 7 contrasts the sourcing patterns 
of a sample of foreign and domestic OEMs for their most popular models. 
   17
Insert Figure 7 here 
 
A domestic Tier 2 supplier in Zhejiang Province that has both a JV and a wholly-
owned facility manufacturing the same component provides an illustration of the relationship 
between quality and cost.  Both the JV and the wholly-owned facility are located in the same 
complex, and the management is the same.  The JV achieves a defect rate of 50 parts per 
million (ppm) compared to 300 to 500 ppm at the wholly-owned facility but has a 20% higher 
cost.  The reason for the cost difference is that the higher quality standard requires a higher 
degree of automation (and hence more expensive equipment) and imported rubber seals 
(Interview 083007).  As we will explain below, this ability of a component firm to supply both 
foreign and domestic OEMs is a critical reason supplier capabilities have been growing rapidly. 
 
b.  Construction equipment 
 
The construction equipment sector includes a wide variety of products (cranes, pavers, 
graders, wheel loaders, dump trucks, scrapers, excavators, etc.) and we focus on two in 
particular:  wheel loaders and excavators.  In contrast to autos, product quality and 
sophistication do not necessarily co-vary (see Figure 4).  First, there is variation in the 
sophistication of products.  Although a wheel loader and an excavator will often perform many 
of the same tasks, the sophistication of the products varies widely.  The engineering of the 
excavator is considerably more complicated.  It runs on high hydraulic pressure, which makes 
the cylinders and the valves that control the flow within the hydraulic system critical because 
they are under enormous pressure during operation. The machine has to both turn and swing on 
the platform, and the integration of hydraulics, engine, and electronics is complex.  In a wheel 
loader, the hydraulics that control the bucket operate at lower pressure, and this makes the 
valves within the hydraulics easier to manufacture; the movement of the arm is only up and 
down, so there is not the same need for the sophisticated electronic controls of the excavator.  
Second, there is quality variation within a product range.  In the case of wheel loaders, for 
example, quarries and mines will typically demand larger and more reliable machines, as will   18
ports. A factory, on the other hand, will use the machine for minor utility functions and will 
look for the most economical model.  Thus, upgrading in the sector can occur within product 
segments as well as between products.  
Over the last ten years the sector has enjoyed explosive growth in all segments, but 
particularly at the low-end.  The demand for wheel loaders, which grew modestly through 2000, 
accelerated afterwards (Table 2).  Despite relatively low final tariffs, imports have been 
marginal in this segment, and almost all of the enormous increase in domestic demand—
primarily for 3 and 5 ton wheel loaders—has been met by firms manufacturing in China (see 
Tables 2 and 3).  These firms are almost exclusively Chinese and they are largely state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs).  In 2006, the FIE share of the domestic wheel-loader market was only 14 
percent and only one of the top five producers was not state-owned.
15   
 
Insert Table 2 here 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
Partly the success of domestic firms is a result of a relatively simple product technology 
that is well-suited to the strengths of Chinese firms.  The labor intensity of fabrication and 
assembly, for example, confer a significant cost advantage to Chinese firms.  In the machining 
process, an earlier generation of lathes can be used rather than computer numerically-controlled 
(CNC) machines; the welding can be also done manually rather than robotically.  Like in the 
case of autos, however, the strength of domestic firms is a result of experience gained over a 
period of decades.  As early as the 1960s, Chinese firms were using technology licensed from 
Japanese firms.  In the 1980s, there were two primary sources of technology in the sector:  the 
Ministry of Machinery, which licensed Caterpillar (CAT) technology for both complete vehicles 
and core components on behalf of core state-owned firms within the sector, and the Tianjin 
Heavy Machinery Research Institute, which developed its own set of designs that drew on a 
combination of foreign models.  With the help of both CAT technical assistance and the support 
of the Tianjin Research Institute, firms were able to master the necessary technologies and 
incrementally improve on the original designs.  These early designs are usually the basis for the   19
models that are produced today, although incremental improvements have changed them beyond 
recognition.   
The widespread availability of designs and the familiarity with manufacturing processes 
offers the same advantages and disadvantages that are found at the low-end of the automotive 
sector.  The advantage is that the slow rate of product change facilitated the development of a 
broad and low-cost supply base for wheel loaders.  This supply base creates critical cost-savings 
for the OEMs, which generally out-source 60 to 70% of total costs, and is a key facet of 
competitive strength.  The disadvantage is that the barriers to entry in the wheel loader segment 
are low.  In 2007, there were still in upwards of 30 firms in China producing wheel-loaders—
down from more than 40 a decade earlier--and in real terms prices have fallen.  Despite this high 
level of fragmentation, however, the share of the top 4 domestic producers—Liugong, 
Longgong, Xiagong, and Lingong—increased from 40 percent in 1999 to 65 percent in 2007.  
As we will argue below, the best of these firms were able to leverage their dominance in the 
low-end segment into growing capabilities in higher value-added segments.     
 
c.  Machine tools 
 
Broadly defined, a machine tool is any stationary, power-driven machine that is used to 
cut, shape, or form materials such as metal or wood.  We focus on the dominant product within 
the machine tool sector, metal-cutting machines (jinshu qiexiao jichuang), and distinguish 
between segments based on product sophistication.  Manually-controlled machines are generally 
less sophisticated than CNC machines.  Within the CNC segment, there is also a range of 
complexity:  the low end is single-axis, single-function CNC machine tools; the mid-range are 
2-axis CNC lathes and machining centers that use a single spindle; the high end are multiple-
spindle, multiple axis (up to 5), multi-function, high speed and precision machine tools.
16 Metal-
cutting machines represent approximately one-third of the Chinese machine tool market.    
In the pre-reform era, China had an extensive machine tool industry that was dominated 
by SOEs.  Long isolated from global markets, these firms were still producing traditional or 
conventional machine tools until the end of the 1970s, and it was only when research institutes   20
under key ministries (e.g. Beijing Machine Tool Institute and the Beijing Electrical Machinery 
Research Institute) and leading firms began to license and reverse engineer technology in the 
1980s that CNC machines began to be produced.  As was the case in autos and wheel-loaders, 
low barriers to entry led to a highly fragmented sector.  In the mid-1990s, there were upwards 
of 100 SOEs producing various kinds of CNC metal-cutting machine tools, but total production 
volumes remained low at less than 10,000 units, and no one firm was producing more than 
several hundred machines. 
Domestic demand for metal-cutting machine tools increased rapidly between 1997 and 
2006, with the acceleration in demand particularly intense after China’s entry into the WTO.  
Total expenditure on metal cutting machine tools rose from US $1.38 billion in 1997 to US $7  
billion in 2006, and in the CNC segment from US$0.22 billion to 2.74 billion.  By 2002, China 
was the largest machine tool market in the world.  In quantity terms demand for CNC machine 
tools increased from 15,200 units in 1997 to 107,482 by 2006, a seven-fold increase (Table 4). 
 
Insert Table 4 
 
This growth in demand was especially pronounced in the lower-end segments, and 
much of this demand was served by domestic firms.  Domestic production increased from 9,051 
units in 1997 to 85,756 units in 2006, most of which was for the domestic market rather than 
exports.  These figures include production by both indigenous firms and FIEs, and the data do 
not separate the two.  The trends in the sector appear to be very similar to what we observed in 
autos and construction, however:  Despite significant entry by FIEs producing in China (initially 
through JVs and increasingly through wholly-owned ventures), the domestic firms continue to 
hold much of the domestic market captured by firms actually producing in China, particularly 
for less sophisticated products.   
CNC lathes, which are half of the overall CNC market, are illustrative. By 2006, there 
were more than 50 Chinese firms producing 40,000 CNC lathes, 80 percent of which were 
classified as economical. Overall, Chinese firms succeeded in raising their share of the domestic 
lathe market from 70 percent by volume (42 percent by value) in 2001 to 81 percent (60 percent   21
by value) in 2005 (China Machine Tool Industry Association 2007:  220).  Shenyang Machine 
Tool and Dalian Machine Tool, with production volumes of 13,457 and 4,694, respectively, 
clearly dominated, but five other domestic firms achieved production volumes of 2000 or more.  
Clearly, domestic Chinese firms are establishing a dominant position in the less technically 
sophisticated product areas of the sector. 
Several factors contributed to the dominance of domestic firms at the low-end.  First, 
new entrants to the sector increased the degree of competition.  SOEs continue to dominate the 
market, but their numbers have fallen slightly as a result of bankruptcy and M&A activity.  
Private firms are increasingly building upon the foundation that was established by the state 
sector:  they take advantage of the widely-available designs for the basic class of CNC 
machine, they tap into the pool of expertise in CNC design and manufacturing that was 
nurtured by key research institutes and SOEs, and they utilize a well-developed domestic 
supply base for critical parts and components that has emerged.   
The growing depth of the supply base is the second key advantage of domestic firms at 
the low-end.  Again, out-sourced critical components represent approximately 70% of the cost 
of the final product, and localization of the supply chain offered a key cost advantage for 
indigenous firms.  Initially, Chinese firms were forced to import many of these components—
e.g. the spindle, bearings, ball screws, motors, and numerical controls—usually from the firm 
that licensed the original product technology (or one of its suppliers), but over time there has 
been nearly complete localization at the first-tier of the supply chain, especially for the 
economical CNC machine .
17  GSK in the case of numerical controls and Han River Machine 
Tool in the case of ballscrews are two prominent examples. Although the system and 
components produced by these two firms are not to the levels of the foreign firms, they allow 
domestic CNC manufacturers to achieve a level of precision and functionality that meets the 
demands of Chinese customers.  Common machine design means that Chinese manufacturers 
are often buying nearly identical components from the same set of suppliers.
18   
 
4.  Pressure at the Top 
   22
Multinational firms enjoy a privileged place in China’s economic landscape.  
According to the research of Pankaj Ghemewat and Thomas Hout (Ghemawat and Hout 2008), 
multinational firms are the market leaders in China in every industry (with the exception of 
telecom network equipment) in which the ratio of R&D intensity to sales and/or the ratio of 
advertising to sales is greater than 8%.  This includes packaged software, mobile phones, 
modern pharmaceuticals, advanced consumer electronics, semiconductors and semiconductor 
equipment, photographic equipment, carbonated beverages, and personal care.  The aggregate 
data that we present in Section 3 reveals a similar pattern:  the market share of foreign firms has 
increased most in sectors that are technology and capital intensive such as vehicles, copiers, and 
hydraulic turbines (see Figure 3).  Similarly within sectors, the foreign firms occupy the 
premium segments.  In the three sectors that we analyze by segment, for instance, the 
multinationals dominate the segments that are occupied by higher quality and more 
technologically sophisticated products: the luxury and upper medium segments of the passenger 
car market, the production of excavators and high-end machining centers. 
The ability of multinational firms to leverage superior technology, sophisticated 
products, and powerful brands into dominant market positions in these high value-added sectors 
and segment is neither surprising nor a China-specific phenomenon.  These are the sectors and 
segments where the differences between the Chinese market and global markets are minimized, 
and thus the foreign firms are able to exploit their strengths in capital and technology-intensive 
activities within the Chinese market.  According to some observers this is a very durable 
advantage.  Peter Nolan and Jin Zhang argue that the concentration of R&D expenditures and 
the control of leading brands by companies based in advanced economies have grown 
dramatically over the last two decades.  “In sharp contrast,” they argue, “developing countries 
are massively disadvantaged in the race to compete on the global-level playing field of 
international big business” (2002:  2092).  The problem, of course, is that in an emerging 
market such as China, the playing field of the domestic market is very different than the global 
playing field:  the fastest growth in the Chinese domestic market is in the middle segment and 
the cost structure of a multinational firm makes it difficult to compete in this segment.  In order   23
to analyze the segmentation of sectors and the pressure on foreign firm, we again turn to the 
automotive, construction equipment and machine tool sectors.  
In the automotive sector, multiple factors are putting pressure on foreign firms.  First, 
as we explained in the previous section, the center of the gravity in the sector is shifting toward 
cars that are less expensive and less sophisticated (Figure 5).  In 2008, close to 40% of the 
entire auto market was for cars priced below RMB 90,000 (Freeman and He 2009), and a 
reduction  in the purchase tax on vehicles with an engine displacement of 1.6 liters and below 
in January 2009 accentuated the trend toward small cars, leading to a 55.5% increase in sales in 
this category during January to August 2009 (Xinhua 2009).  Second, prices are falling:  
between 2000 and 2005, the average annual drop in car prices calculated at the car model level 
was 9%.
19  Third, the quality levels of the domestic firms that dominate the bottom of the 
market are rising.  Although the quality level of passenger vehicles produced by domestic firms 
was inferior to those produced by FIEs, the gap has been shrinking.  J.D. Power quality 
surveys, for instance, use a metric called “PP100,” or problems per 100 vehicles.  The surveys 
were first conducted in China in 2000, and the average score for domestic firms was higher 
than 800.  In 2006, the average for domestic firms in China was 368.  This was still far higher 
than the average of 189 for FIEs or the average of 124 for a U.S.-produced vehicle, but clearly 
the domestic firms that dominated the bottom of the market were making progress (Li 2007).   
In the construction equipment sector, the domestic firms are increasing their quality in 
the lower-end product segments (wheel-loaders) and are beginning to enter the more 
sophisticated product segments (excavators).  In the wheel-loader market, according to the 
analysis of a western manufacturer, there are five segments of the market:   1) world-class; 2) 
premium; 3) heavy construction/mining; 4) general construction; and 5) low-end (Interview no. 
050709) (See Figure 7).
20  Foreign firms dominate the world-class segment, but the segment is 
small—approximately 100 units in 2007.  In the premium segment, foreign firms compete 
aggressively with the most capable of the Chinese manufacturers (i.e. Liugong, Longgong, 
Xiagong, and Lingong) and volumes are still relatively low (approximately 3,000 units in 2007).  
The bulk of the market is in middle two segments (heavy construction/mining and general 
construction), where there were combined sales of 105,000 units in 2007.  These segments are   24
virtually the exclusive preserve of Chinese firms.  Low-end machines can be as inexpensive as 
RMB 30,000, and 20,000 units were sold in this segment in 2007.   
In more sophisticated product areas such as excavators, the position of foreign firms is 
stronger.  As Tables 2 and 3 illustrate, foreign firms dominate the Chinese market for excavators 
both through production in China (54.5 percent
21of the total domestic market in 2006) and 
through imports (40.6 percent of the market in 2006).  But even in this area of strength, there are 
signs that high prices have opened the door for less expensive excavators manufactured by 
Chinese firms.  In the last three or four years, there has been significant entry and a very 
pronounced expansion in the production of excavators by domestic firms.  In 2007, total sales of 
Chinese firms, both domestically and overseas, nearly doubled to over 20,000 units.  Much of 
the increase in production went to the domestic market, and the market share of domestic firms 
in the excavator market climbed from 5 percent in 2006 to 7 percent in 2007.  Preliminary 
estimates for 2008 suggest a further rise, with Sanyi and Liugong emerging as important 
domestic players.   
Machine tools differ from either autos or construction equipment (especially wheel 
loaders) in that foreign firms have been able to capture a significant portion of domestic market 
growth largely through imports. This partially reflects differences in tariff treatment between the 
sectors.  In 1998, the average tariff on machine tool imports was 14.2 percent, and this fell to 
10.3 percent by 2006.  
Imports primarily serve the upper end of the market and have typically been three to 
four times more expensive than CNC machine manufactured domestically (see Table 4).  This 
has not made foreign firms immune from pressures, however, as domestic firms have acquired 
capabilities in premium product segments such as machining centers.  Between 1996 and 2005, 
sales of machining centers grew rapidly in China, and represented nearly twenty percent of all 
metal-cutting CNC machines consumed domestically in 2005.  By 2005, nearly 30% of these 
machines were manufactured within China (see Figure 9).  This percentage includes both 
domestic firms and FIEs, but China’s Machine Tool Manufacturer’s Association estimates the 
machining center sales of Chinese firms to be approximately 2,500 to 3,000, implying that   25
domestic firms were supplying roughly 20% of the domestic market for machining centers 
(China Machine Tool Industry Association 2007:  222, Table 4). 
 
Insert Figure 9 here 
 
Data reported in Table 5 supports the view that Chinese firms are succeeding in the 
lower-end of these more sophisticated product markets.  For example, in the case of vertical 
machining centers, Chinese machining centers were a third less than the price of imports. These 
kinds of pressures on foreign firms help cast new light on the behavior of the price of imported 
CNC machines, which rose by more than fifty percent. As Chinese firms made inroads into the 
lower-end of these product markets, foreign firms succeeded in retaining market share in part by 
selling even more sophisticated machines to domestic users. 
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
In short, FIEs in these three sectors face a similar set of challenges.  The fastest growth 
in these sectors is in exactly the segments where foreign firms find it most difficult to compete.  
Even in the premium segments in which they dominate, domestic firms are beginning to make 
inroads (although this is less true in automotive).  As one top executive at a foreign construction 
equipment firms succinctly explained, “[Our] value proposition does not fit the Chinese buyer 
(Interview 050709).”  The critical question is whether this value proposition can be altered.   
 
5.  The Fight for the Middle 
 
The automotive, construction, and machine tool markets in China are the largest in the 
world and the fastest growth in these sectors is in the middle segments.   Foreign firms are eager 
to access these middle segments because the volumes are so large; domestic firms seek to access 
them because they are eager to escape the intense competition (and consequent low profit 
margins) in the bottom segments of the market.  Each face different challenges: The foreign   26
firms must lower their cost structures while the domestic firms must raise their technical and 
quality standards.  The interaction of these two dynamics deepens the capability building in 
Chinese industry.   
 
(a) Foreign firms struggle to lower costs 
   
The cost structure of a multinational firm is closely related to its global strategy.  
Ghemewat groups the global strategies of multinational firms into three different categories—
aggregation, adaptation, and arbitrage—and argues that the motivations for each strategy will 
vary.  Firms that aggregate seek to take advantage of economies of scale and scope by 
standardizing products and processes globally (and the motivation is usually the high cost of 
R&D relative to sales); firms that pursue adaptation strive to achieve local relevance by 
adapting to local conditions (while ideally controlling the cost of excessive variety and 
complexity); firms that seek arbitrage opportunities exploit the specialized advantages that are 
available in a diverse set of locations (and deploy these advantages globally).   
The dominant strategy in the sectors that we analyze is aggregation—all are capital 
intensive and have high R&D costs—and this strategy shapes the cost structure of firms.  
Although a strategy of aggregation allows a firm to maximize global economies of scale, it can 
have the unintended side effect of locking a firm into a high-end segment of a market when 
they seek to expand into the developing world.  First, because the product is designed for 
advanced markets, and the firm is seeking to limit the extent of adaptation, the product may be 
more sophisticated and of higher quality than the market in a developing economy demands.  A 
“good enough” market (or market segment) seeks reliable-enough products at low-enough 
prices (Gadiesh, Leung et al. 2007).  It is often not easy to lower the costs of the products 
because their sophistication and quality requires more capital (and technology) intensive 
manufacturing operations.
22  Second, the foreign firm is often required to use components from 
global suppliers because only these components will meet the exacting specification required 
by the designs (and needless to say, common components will also maximize global economies 
of scale).
23  In many cases, an OEM firm relies on key suppliers for design capabilities and this   27
dependence generates additional incentives to bring global suppliers to China (what is called 
“follow sourcing”) or to import key components (Humphrey and Memedovic 2003; Lester and 
Sturgeon 2004).  Finally, the location and global orientation of design activities reinforces the 
bias against fully utilizing low-cost domestic suppliers.  The process of getting a local supplier 
approved by the design center at headquarters (in conformance with a global design policy) can 
be time-consuming and difficult, and the absence of a local design center makes it difficult to 
provide local suppliers the engineering support they need to upgrade their manufacturing levels 
to the appropriate standards.    
At the aggregate level, it is extremely difficult to measure the extent to which foreign 
firms are localizing their operations in China.  To give one indication, however, we utilized 
firm-level data on imported intermediate goods and total expenditure on inputs for the period 
between 2000 and 2005 in order to measure the extent to which FIEs in China have been 
reducing their reliance on imported input and increasing their use of inputs sourced in China.  
This is an imperfect measure because an input sourced within China could still be manufactured 
by a global supplier rather than a Chinese firm, but the results point to both a decline in the 
percentage of foreign firms using imported intermediates from 55% to 49.8%, and a reduction 
in their share of total input expenditure from 28% to 24.1%.
24  
Localization activities are more easily depicted at the sector level.  In the auto sector, 
the Chinese government has always exerted pressure on foreign firms to utilize local suppliers, 
but given the strong incentives for global OEMs to continue sourcing from their global 
suppliers, government restrictions were commonly evaded.
25  Since WTO accession, two trends 
have changed the calculations of global auto firms.  First, the ratio of Chinese versus global 
sales for particular models has steadily been changing in favor of the former.  In 2007, the 
Chinese sales of the VW Jetta/Bora, the Audi A6, GM’s Buick Lacrosse, the Toyota Reiz and 
Crown, and the Hyundai Elantra exceeded 30% of global sales.  In the cases of VW, GM, and 
Toyota, the China sales of these models exceeded sales in their home market (Fourin 2008).  
The increase in the relative importance of the Chinese market creates strong incentives for 
global firms to locate design activities in China and to shape global platforms according to the 
demands of the Chinese market.  Second, the increase in competition that we described in the   28
previous section forces localization because firms that rely too heavily on imported components 
(or global suppliers that import components) have difficulty lowering their costs.  When 
Volkswagen’s market share in China fell from 56% in 1996 to 16% in 2005, for example, the 
company announced a restructuring program that sought to reduce costs by 40% through an 
aggressive localization program.  The intent was to increase domestic content rates for all 
models to above 80%.
26  Other OEM firms have made similar efforts (although the extent and 
timing of these localization drives varies according to the home region of the OEM) and the 
competitive pressure that drives these localization efforts spreads throughout the supply 
network.     
The incentives of the market and the pressure of competition push localization down 
the supply chain.  In 2007, for example, Firm A, a global Tier 1 supplier of braking systems 
manufacturing in Shanghai, was under intense pressure from its foreign OEM customers to 
lower costs.  At the same time, it was eager to supply the domestic OEMs that were rapidly 
gaining market share (and which demanded even lower costs).  There were two primary hurdles 
to lowering costs.  First, the products were over-engineered.  The high standards of the 
engineering allowed the firm to achieve the highest level of quality, but the sophisticated 
products required more capital investment in equipment and design.  A Chinese competitor 
would utilize a simpler design in order to achieve an acceptable (if not exceptional) level of 
quality at a much lower cost (Interview 083107).
27  Second, the engineering costs imposed by 
the global parent firm were too high.  Although the firm had a return of 25% on operating 
income, 80% of this (or 20% of operating income) was allocated to support technical centers in 
the home country (Interview 080509).  Due to falling volumes for the global business unit, the 
successful China operations were relied upon to support an ever greater percentage of global 
engineering costs.  Labor costs were not an issue for Firm A, since they were only .5% of total 
costs (as compared to 30% in its home country).  
 The solution to these cost problems was to increase the extent of production that was 
outsourced to domestically-owned Tier 2 suppliers.  The challenge was to lower costs through 
out-sourcing while both maintaining the quality standard demanded by the OEM customer and 
protecting the firm’s own core capability.  As is quite common in a global value chain, the Tier   29
1 global supplier became the tutor of the Tier 2 domestic firm.  For example, one of the most 
important of the Tier 2 suppliers, Firm B, was provided with designs, tooling, and 6 or 7 
engineers to oversee the production process (Interview 051607).  The defect rate at the supplier 
went from being 1/3—i.e.  entire production batches had to be scrapped—to within the 6 ppm 
standard imposed by the foreign OEM (Interview 083107).  The extent to which Firm A 
outsourced the components of a particular product depended on the balance of low cost and 
quality demanded by the final OEM customer, as well as its desire to preserve its technical 
advantage over Firm B.  When the Tier 1 firm was able to out-source 95% or more by value to 
domestic suppliers, as was the case with drum brakes, the firm could match the price of it 
Chinese competitors, and it could sell to domestic OEMs.  As the outsourcing rate slipped 
below 90%, as was the case with disc brakes, the Chinese competitors had a 10-20% price 
advantage (Interview 083107), but the higher quality of Firm A would continue to give it an 
advantage with foreign OEMs.
28  This example of a global Tier 1 supplier increasing the degree 
of out-sourcing and supporting the development of Tier 2 capabilities is not an isolated 
phenomenon.  In a benchmarking survey of 3 Tier 1 global supply firms manufacturing in 
coastal China, the average defect rates of their lower tier suppliers—almost all of whom were 
domestic firms-- improved from 421.7 ppm  in 2003 to 122.9 ppm in 2006 (Brandt and Van 
Biesebroeck, 2009).    
In the construction equipment sector, the incentives offered by the middle segment of 
the market vary by product.  The technical demands of an excavator continue to limit the 
possibilities for localization and the cost of design creates a strong incentive to standardize 
products globally.  The product sold in China is identical to the global product, and if a new 
Chinese supplier is to be certified, it must reach the global standard.
29  Given the size of the 
technology gap between global and domestic suppliers, the OEM firms make careful choices.  
The core components—engine, hydraulics, and electronic control systems—continue to be 
made by foreign firms.  These components are under enormous pressure during operation, and a 
core competitive advantage of a foreign firm is the ability to optimize the interaction of the 
three (sometimes working with key global suppliers).  Careful choices are made in other 
instances:  the bucket of an excavator, for instance, is outsourced to a local supplier by one   30
leading foreign manufacturer, but the cutting edge of the bucket is imported because it receives 
a proprietary heat treatment (Interview 081007b).  The technical demands of the product and 
the consequent difficulty of out-sourcing serves as a firewall against the domestic firms that are 
attempting to move into excavator manufacturing:  because domestic firm must also use foreign 
components, they have limited price advantage vis-à-vis foreign competitors, and because they 
have lower global volumes in this product range, the global suppliers are unwilling (and the 
Chinese firm is unable) to customize and optimize core components for the Chinese machine 
(Interview 112108).  The position of foreign firms is still strong.   
In the wheel loader segment, the incentives of foreign firms are very different.  As 
described in the previous sections, the bulk of the Chinese market is in mid-range segments, 
price competition is intense, and the technical barriers to entry are low.  Two-thirds of global 
wheel-loader sales (by unit) were in China in 2006, but these sales represent only one-third of 
global sales by value (Interview 050709).  Although global firms might be tempted to focus on 
the fact that Chinese sales are only one-third of global sales by value, they are keenly aware of 
the fact that the low-cost Chinese producers are rapidly expanding global sales, and a foreign 
firm with over-engineered products and high overhead costs cannot hope to compete outside of 
the premium segment.    
A solution that multiple foreign firms have adapted is to acquire (or invest in) a 
Chinese company:  the products of the Chinese firms are designed for the domestic market 
(rather than high-end global markets), the firms have lower cost structures, and they have well-
developed networks of domestic suppliers (Interview 120907).  It is easier for a foreign firm to 
increase the capabilities of a low-cost domestic manufacturing operation than it is to decrease 
the cost at a high-cost foreign operation because the latter approach would only be successful if 
an entirely new product was designed.  The Chinese firms are highly skilled at designing 
products that are easy to produce, easy to maintain, and easy to repair. 
The initial emphasis of the foreign firm is on improving the product and processes at 
the acquired assembly plant—introducing lean manufacturing techniques and new process 
controls (such as production planning systems, failure analysis systems, etc.) and providing the 
engineering support to make product improvements (Interview 112408a).  The emphasis then   31
begins to shift to the supply chain, and as in the example of the automotive braking firms, the 
foreign firm plays a key role in upgrading supplier capabilities.   To give one example, Firm C 
is a domestic wheel loader firm that has been acquired by Firm D, a leading foreign 
manufacturer of construction equipment.  Engineers from the foreign firm identified the engine 
cooling pack as being one of the key problems in the Chinese design:  when operated in high 
temperatures, the engine had a tendency to overheat.  Although Firm D had a global supplier of 
cooling packages that it could have turned to, Firm C identified a private sector firm in 
Zhejiang that was capable of quality levels similar to the global supplier at a 20% lower cost for 
new products and 40%  lower for older (080509).  Firm D used its newly-opened design center 
in China to design a new cooling pack for the Zhejiang supplier, and deployed a supplier 
development team, a design team, and a global purchasing team to develop the capabilities of 
the Zhejiang firm.  This abundance of resources could not have been afforded by a low-cost 
producer such as Firm C, but because Firm D intended to integrate the Zhejiang supplier into its 
global procurement it could cover the cost of supplier development (Interview 112408b).  The 
overall quality level of components purchased by Firm C has steadily improved.  In 2005, the 
warranty ration was 3.6% of total purchasing; in 2008 it was 1.6% (Interview 112408b).  
 A similar dynamic is evident in the machine tool industry, and foreign manufacturers 
are setting up either JVs or wholly-owned operations as a way to lower costs and capture 
domestic market share.  Initially, these ventures were largely involved in machining the base of 
the CNC machine, a relatively labor intensive activity, and components were imported.
30  Over 
time localization has increased both inside and outside the firm.  The latter opportunities have 
expanded as key suppliers in the industry have also set up factories in China to service overseas 
customers.  For less demanding parts and components, the foreign firms are able to take 
advantage of the low capabilities that were described in the previous section.  Taiwanese CNC 
manufacturers in the lower Yangtze region, for instance, have been very successful in finding 
local suppliers for 60% of their parts and components.  One JV between a Japanese and Chinese 
firm that we visited in 2007 succeeded in localizing 80% of the components going into a CNC 
lathe, some of this done in-house, and others outside.  The firm’s manufacturing cost in China is 
50% lower than in Japan (exclusive of the costs of the technology), and most of these savings   32
came from lower sourcing costs (Interview 121807).   The Japanese partner was considering 
moving all of the production of this particular product line to China, where quality was just as 
good.  
Manufacturing in China by leading foreign CNC manufacturers is now also extending 
to basic vertical and horizontal machining centers, which sell for in upwards of US $100,000 to 
US $150,000.  Again, a key motivation is costs.  One of the world’s premier CNC firms we 
interviewed set of goal of 60% domestic sourcing for their operations in China, despite its plan 
to continue to procure the numerical controls and spindle bearings from the overseas parent.  As 
in the case of CNC lathes, sourcing domestically would include in-house, as well as from firms 
now manufacturing in China. For critical components like the balls-crew, this would be from 
JVs or WOS. 
In all these cases, the localization of purchasing necessitates a certain amount of 
localization of design and engineering.  A design center facilitates the localization of component 
purchasing because the design staff can work with local suppliers to increase their 
manufacturing capabilities.  Several factors are important. First, the foreign firm needs trained 
personnel and engineers who are capable of working with local suppliers to help them improve 
their manufacturing and quality control processes.  Quality engineers are critically important 
and particularly ones that speak Chinese.  Both the OEM firms and the Tier 1 suppliers have 
large teams in China that will conduct surveys of potential Chinese suppliers, and then 
essentially live in the factories while working with them to improve their quality standards.  The 
Chinese supplier is delivering a component that will go into a product with a foreign brand, so 
the foreign customer has every incentive to teach the supplier well. Second, the foreign firm 
needs the capability within house to make modest design modifications to their products in 
order to facilitate lower cost sourcing without sacrificing either performance or quality (and this 
follows a long tradition in the auto industry of changing designs for manufacturability).
31  
Finally, and a point that relates equally to OEM and supply firms, a design center in China 
allows a foreign firm to be more responsive to the demands of domestic market.     
 
b) Domestic firms struggle to upgrade   33
 
  Which domestic firms will have the capacity to challenge the foreign firms for the 
middle segments of the Chinese market?  While this is not a question that we can answer with 
any precision, we can point to three dynamics that are common to each of the sectors that we 
have analyzed in detail.   
  First, the competitive dynamics of the Chinese market deepen the channels of 
upgrading within the domestic supply base.  In the previous section, we explained how cost 
pressure forces foreign firms to localize activities.  Localization by foreign firms inherently 
involves building the capabilities of domestic suppliers, but whenever possible, a foreign firm 
will adapt a strategy that allows it to benefit from the lower cost structure of a domestic 
supplier without nurturing a future competitor (Arrunada and Vazquez 2006).  In each of the 
examples cited in the previous section, for example, the foreign firm had thought carefully 
about how it could safeguard its own core technology.  In the case of brakes, the foreign firms 
have sought to protect their advantage in anti-lock braking systems (ABS).  In the case of one 
JV, for instance, the foreign firm continues to import the software and the electronic control 
unit (60% of the overall value).  Another durable advantage is testing:  an ABS system must be 
altered for every model, and this requires the model to be tested under all conceivable road 
conditions.  The advantage of the foreign firm is its database of all past failures, and the ability 
to use this information to test and adapt a product for a new model (Interview 090707).  In the 
case of the cooling package for a wheel loader, the foreign firm believed its core capability was 
system integration.  In order to source from the Zhejiang supplier, the foreign firm deployed 
considerable resources to improve the manufacturing process of the supplier.  Controlling the 
speed and temperature of the “brazing,” a form of welding, is the critical skill in manufacturing 
an oil cooler (Interview 050909).  Once the supplier has mastered this skill, of course, the 
resulting improvement in the quality off the component benefits all of its customers.  Although 
the foreign firm was well aware of this, it believed that other firms would not be able to 
duplicate its ability to optimize the performance of the cooling package when it is placed in the 
engine (Interview 050709).  The relationship between a foreign firms and a Chinese supplier is 
a complex mix of collaboration and competition.   34
The advantage that a Chinese supply firm has, when compared to a local supplier that is 
participating in a global value chain in a country with an insignificant domestic market, is the 
possibility of participating in multiple value chains.  In the three sectors that we have analyzed 
in detail, the low-end segment of each market is dominated by ambitious domestic OEMs.  Like 
their foreign competitors, the domestic OEMs rely heavily on their domestic suppliers, but in a 
very different way.  Rather than trying to limit the advancement of domestic suppliers, the 
domestic OEMs, themselves weak in design capabilities, are eager to have the domestic 
suppliers broaden and strengthen their capabilities.  Rather than force them to manufacture low-
value added components in a lower tier of the value chain, the domestic OEMs encourage the 
domestic suppliers to occupy the first tier and provide full modules.  To return to the examples 
from above, the domestic braking firm will sell the full ABS systems to a domestic OEM 
(while the foreign customers will insist on using a JV that has access to foreign software or a 
global supplier).  Another brake supply firm sells only components of a disc brake to foreign 
customers, but will sell the complete front chassis (including the brakes) to domestic firms.  In 
the case of the supplier of cooling packages, the firm works on a “build-to-print” basis with its 
foreign customers—i.e.  it is given detailed designs to the component—but will design and test 
the component for a domestic OEM (and the customer will provide only general specifications).    
A technical director of a domestic auto supply firm compared the relationships with a 
foreign versus domestic OEM to a rectangle that is sitting on end as opposed to one that is lying 
flat.  The former symbolizes the relationship with a foreign company:  it is narrow and deep.  
The domestic supplier can achieve a high level of competence very quickly because a global 
supplier will be assisting them, but the range of capabilities will be narrow.  The latter 
represents the relationships with a domestic OEM:  the domestic supplier can learn a great 
breadth of things, but the knowledge is not as deep because the domestic OEM is not in a 
position to provide as much assistance (Interview 051607b).  The natural conclusion, of course, 
is to have both sets of relationships; the one complements the other.  The increase in the 
capabilities of domestic suppliers supports the development of the domestic OEMs, because 
they are willing to utilize domestic (as opposed to global) suppliers to a greater extent than the 
foreign OEMs.     35
Second, the importance of foreign linkages extends beyond supplier relationships.  
FIEs in China are an important source of competition for Chinese firms, forcing them to utilize 
resources more efficiently and upgrade their capabilities (Brandt, Rawski and Sutton 2008), but 
they also create multiple channels of upgrading (For a general discussion, see Crespo and 
Fontoura 2007).  One of the most explicit channels, and one that is present in all three sectors, 
is the use of joint ventures.  Initial Chinese efforts to master new products and manufacturing 
processes often began with various forms of technical licensing and short-term cooperation. 
These efforts often proved inadequate, and Chinese firms turned to joint ventures as a means of 
developing core competencies and/or expanding capabilities in core components and related 
product lines. Beijing Number 1 Machine Tool, for example, established a JV with Okuma, a 
leading Japanese firm, for the manufacture of a basic line of CNC machines. Shenyang 
Machine Tool, on the other hand, has entered into a number of JVs for the purpose of 
expanding into more sophisticated machining centers. The leading firm in wheel loaders 
formed a JV that manufactures transmissions with a leading German company; leading auto 
firms have established JVs for the production of engines; domestic machine tool companies 
have formed JVs to acquire basic manufacturing knowledge, but also to expand product line.  
More recently, Chinese firms have begun to look outward as a way to acquire critical 
capabilities, and market access.  Wanxiang’s recent acquisition of four Dana auto-part plants in 
North America and acquisitions by Shenyang Machine Tool and Dalian Machine tool in the US 
and Germany are cases in point.   
The flow of human capital from foreign to domestic firms has also been an essential 
part of the upgrading process in China.  The domestic firms that are able to differentiate 
themselves from their domestic competitors are able to hire employees with training at foreign 
firm firms.  The firms with the most resources (sometimes the result of state support) hire 
consultants and overseas returnees with multinational experience.  One leading domestic auto 
firm, for instance, staffed key technical positions with former employees of companies such as 
Ford, Visteon, Honda, Motorola, and TRW. As a returnee manager commented, the local 
engineers are very smart, but they have less experience with project management and real 
design work (Interview 080105).  The returnees, many of whom had come up against glass   36
ceilings abroad, have the experience necessary to harness this local talent and push the 
development process forward far more quickly than would otherwise be the case.  Firms that 
are ambitious yet unable to afford the salaries demanded by returnees or pay the high fees of 
consultants, hire Chinese employees from the JVs and as well as recent  retirees from the JVs (a 
slightly cheaper option).
32  As we have argued, competitive pressures force foreign firms to 
localize high-value added activities such as design in China, and this further deepens the pool 
of well-trained human capital that is available to be poached by domestic firms.   
Finally, the domestic firms that are most successful in upgrading their capabilities are 
those that are able to take advantage of pre-existing capabilities within the Chinese economy.  
State-owned firms are the most direct beneficiaries, and they continue to play a critical role in 
autos, construction equipment, and machine tools, particularly those that are able to effectively 
restructure and improve governance.  Although many SOEs continue to receive policy support, 
they also have the advantage of deep experience with a particular product range.  Extensive 
experience with a product design and strong engineering capabilities allow an SOE to make 
incremental improvements over time; feedback from customers over the course of decades 
leads to product and process changes, and this leads to continuous improvements in product 
quality.  These advantages are likely to be most important in sectors where the evolution of 
technology is incremental and the rate of change is slow.   
The dominant domestic firm in the construction equipment sector, for instance, 
continues to be the same firm that initially licensed the 5-ton model from the Ministry of 
Machinery in the 1980s.  When the designs for this model became widely available in the 
1990s, there was a high rate of entry from private sector firms and fierce price wars, but the 
firm was able to maintain a dominant position through a process of steady, incremental 
improvement.  The current 5 ton model of the firm is considered a 3
rd generation model and 
entails significant upgrading in design and technology:  it meets European and US 
environmental standards for road equipment, it utilizes a higher pressure hydraulic system (and 
has improved productivity), the engine is produced in a JV with a leading foreign firm, and the 
model has improved ergonomics and electronic controls (Interview 072808).  The firm is also 
able to utilize a broad distribution network to collect feedback from customers and the   37
resources of a 400 person R&D centre to make the necessary changes.  Although the current 
product is derived from the same basic model that was licensed two decades ago, it is a very 
different machine, and the firm is able to charge a premium of 10-15 percent over competitors.   
Private sector firms also draw on the resources of the state sector.  These firms are 
more efficient and flexible than their SOE counterparts, but they often lack the manufacturing 
experience as well as strong design and engineering capabilities.  Since the mid-1990s, the 
resources of the latter have become increasingly diffuse as key research institutes—the 
beneficiaries of state investment, human capital, and technology licensing agreements with key 
foreign firms for decades—have sought to commercialize their assets.  These institutes (as well 
as universities) are willing to work with any firm that will pay the appropriate fee.   Human 
capital that has been nurtured in state-owned firms (particularly with respect to engineering) 
has also become highly mobile within China, and it flow to those firms that offer the highest 
wages and most attractive working conditions.  Bankruptcy in SOEs also often frees up 
valuable human resources, including entire R&D departments.  A leading private heavy 
construction equipment firm, for example, hired key R&D personnel from an unsuccessful JV 
as part of its move into excavators.    
As the private sector firms struggle to gain engineering and technical skills, they 
compensate for their relatively limited resources by focusing their efforts.  A firm will focus on 
a particular product niche in which the domestic competition is not intense, dominate the 
segment, and then use the revenue generated to fund expansion into other areas.  One of the 
most rapidly growing firms in the Chinese construction equipment industry, for example, began 
producing concrete pumps in 1994, when 85-90% of the Chinese market was served by 
imports.  The firm initially had poor quality, but as the manager in the R&D institute explained, 
careful analysis of foreign products made it clear that there was nothing mysterious about the 
technology and the key SOEs in the segment had poor management (Interview 111908a).  Early 
efforts benefited from linkages to a local state-run construction industry research institute; key 
components that were beyond the firm’s initial capabilities could be imported.  As the firm 
gained market share it was able to invest heavily in R&D personnel (many  of whom were hired 
from state-owned competitors), and initial success in pumps funded expansion into higher   38
value-added segments such as excavators.  By 2007, the firm controlled 50% of the Chinese 
market for concrete pumps and total revenue was approximately 20 billion RMB (slightly less 
than half of which was from concrete pumps and mixers).  It is the most rapidly growing firm 
in China’s construction equipment sect.   
In short, the state-owned and private firms will often have a slightly different product 
focus—the former rely on incremental improvements to pre-existing products and the latter 
focus on niche markets—but the overall strategy is similar:  revenue from products that are 
characterized by relatively low technology gaps (relative to their capabilities) provide a secure 
source of revenue that can be used to help support the shift into technologically more 
sophisticated (and more profitable) products.  Machine tool manufacturers benefit from a robust 
market for their traditional lathes to develop capabilities in CNC machine tools; heavy 
construction manufacturers leverage sales from wheel loaders (or concrete pumps in the case of 
a private firm) to develop capabilities in excavators; auto firms dominated in small cars (or a 
particular component) and then moved into more sophisticated models (or components).  These 
firms benefit from multiple forms of linkages to the foreign-invested sector, and they benefit 
from the capabilities that foreign firms have labored to create within the supply base.      
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
In comparison to other developing countries, China has distinct advantages. The most 
obvious is the size of the domestic market, the potential of which has been in the sights of 
foreign firms since as early as the mid-19
th century.  Through the first decade and a half of the 
reform period, China pursued relatively protectionist policies with respect to this market.  In 
some sectors, entry by FIEs was difficult, and the only option was the licensing of technology to 
Chinese firms. In other sectors, FDI was encouraged, but often only with a state-owned partner.  
Tariffs were set relatively high.  Local sourcing requirements were also stressed.  These policies 
succeeded, albeit unevenly, in helping to develop local manufacturing capabilities, but there 
were limitations.  Barriers to trade within China, restrictions on entry, and high tariffs served to   39
limit competition between firms and restricted growth of the domestic market.  Efficiency likely 
suffered as a result. 
 In the period leading up to and following China’s entry into WTO, domestic markets were 
significantly liberalized and competition increased from both within and outside China.  
Concerns were expressed that Chinese firms would not be able to weather the competition, and 
would be an obvious causality, losing market to both FIEs and imports.   In hindsight, Chinese 
firms have fared reasonably well.  Our estimates suggest that the domestic market share of 
Chinese firms has fallen ten percentage points since 1995, but the decline slowed after 2001, 
and the last few years actually appears to be moving upwards.  Within manufacturing, there are 
the expected cases of success in more labor-intensive sectors in which China has a comparative 
advantage, but even in more capital-intensive sectors where market share appears to have 
declined, there is much more going on than meets the eye. 
In this paper, we argue that the success of Chinese firms in these other sectors can be 
viewed as an “unanticipated” consequence of reforms that enabled China to leverage its earlier 
efforts in capability building and better take advantage of one of its greatest potential assets: a 
huge domestic market. The growth of this market, which has outstripped GDP growth in 
numerous sectors, has had a dual impact in the sectors that we examined.   
In autos, construction equipment and CNC machine tools the low-end of the domestic 
market is the preserve of the domestic Chinese firms.  Here they benefit from natural barriers to 
entry, the most important of which is the inability of FIEs to lower their cost structures.  
Domestic market liberalization has exposed Chinese firms to intensified pressure from other 
domestic firms and entrants, but rapid growth in these low-end segments are allowing the more 
capable domestic firms to gain from scale, experience, and revenue vital to upgrading efforts 
and shifts to higher-end segments.   
Analogously, the lure of these rapidly growing lower-end segments of the market and 
competitive pressures provide incentives for the foreign firms that dominate the high-end of the 
domestic market to localize sourcing (both of components and capital equipment) and design 
activities so as to lower cost and increase responsiveness to consumer demand.  These 
localization efforts are exactly the result that the government had sought for decades, but intense   40
competition and expansion in the domestic market are now offering incentives that are far more 
powerful than protective tariffs or government fiat.     
The interaction of these two dynamic forces builds on a second advantage that China has 
over many developing countries:  the strong manufacturing capabilities that were nurtured prior 
to liberalization, particularly in supply networks.  When the domestic market began to expand 
rapidly in size and competition intensified, domestic suppliers were not at global standards of 
productivity and quality, but they had basic capabilities. FIEs are increasingly willing to work 
with Tier 1 and Tier 2 domestic supply firms and transfer necessary processing and 
manufacturing skills because they are keen to lower their cost structure.  Domestic OEMs 
provide less technical support, but offer these same supply firms an opportunity to increase their 
breadth of capabilities, along with high volume business. The opportunity to participate in 
multiple value chains provided complementary upgrading opportunities. 
Not all Chinese firms within these sectors are in an equally advantageous position, and we 
are not in a position to predict which Chinese firms will emerge as strong global competitors.  
We see strong capabilities emerging in these three sectors, but the success and failure of 
individual firms depends on many factors, the scope of which is beyond this study.   What we 
can say with confidence is that, given the manner in which the dynamics of competition lead to 
capability building within China, there is less need for Chinese policy-makers to worry about 
where exactly these capabilities reside within these sectors (i.e. with SOEs, private firms, or 
FIEs), and more on fostering an environment in which these capabilities are nurtured and 
allowed to grow.  This includes providing a level playing field for all firms and ensuring 
continued competition in sectors, allowing an effective re-allocation of resources within the 
Chinese economy, both to SOEs that are successfully re-structured and to the private sectors 
firms that are the most entrepreneurial, and supporting supplier development.   
It should also be noted that the sectors that we have focused in this paper are not 
representative of all sectors in the Chinese economy.   In addition to the variables that we have 
just pointed to—the large size of the low-end segment in these sectors and the strong pre-
existing capabilities—the most important characteristic is that they are relatively mature 
sectors.  The rate of product and technical change varies by sector, but is relatively slow in   41
each.  Change in manufacturing processes also tends to be slow.  The rate of change is critical 
because it determines the ability of a Chinese firm to recoup an investment in either product or 
process upgrading.  If the product characteristics within a sector change too rapidly, a firm that 
has invested in a laborious and expensive process of upgrading may soon find the capabilities it 
invested are obsolete.  In our future research, we seek to understand how the characteristics of 
the sector alter the competitive dynamics that we have described in this paper.    
Who will prevail in the fight for the middle?  It is not yet clear who will win in the race 
between the domestic OEM firms that are labouring to upgrade their capabilities and the 
foreign firms that are struggling to lower their costs.  The dynamics of competition that we 
have described in this paper are providing a window of opportunity for the domestic firms, but 
this window will not be open indefinitely.  Foreign firms will succeed in lowering their costs, 
while rising incomes and increasing consumer sophistication may lead to increasing demand for 
the high-end goods that favour foreign firms.  In either case, the strongest firms are likely to be 
those that rely heavily on the strong capabilities that have developed within China, including 
those within the Chinese supply chains.       42
 
 
                                                 
1 The category of FIE includes both wholly-owned foreign enterprises and joint ventures. 
2 There is no single model of a development state.  Much to the contrary, there is significant variation 
(Önis 1991:  118).  In the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis, there was also a re-evaluation of the 
efficacy of the developemental state approach (Pempel 1999; Stiglitz and Yusuf 2001). 
3 FDI played a more important role in Taiwan than in Korea and Japan, but Wade (1990:  149) argues that 
its importance is often exaggerated:  “as a source of capital [FDI] accounted for only 3 to 10 percent of 
gross domestic capital formation over the 1970s, averaging 4 percent, and 8 percent of manufacturing 
investment.” Korea relied heavily on Japanese technology (see Kohli 2004:  114-115), but as Amsden 
(1989:  74) notes, “direct foreign investment in the form of equity ownership by foreigners of production 
facilities in Korea has been minimal.  Singapore is a key exception:  with a population of less than 3 
million and little domestic industry, the city-state relied almost completely on foreign direct investment.  
4 Since much of the technology transfer incurred in the context of JVs, in which SOEs were often 
partners, the bias favoured SOEs and worked against non-SOEs.  In numerous sectors, including several 
we look at, the hope was that the transfer of manufacturing and managerial knowhow would benefit the 
“independent” manufacturing operations of the SOE partner. 
5 See also Kennedy, S. (2005). China's Porous Protectionism:  The Changing Political Economy of Trade 
Policy. Political Science Quarterly 120(3), 407-432.. 
6 Gereffi, in his analysis of the garment industry, sees a fairly steady progression from OEM to ODM to 
OBM.  He describes an iterative process:  the buyers work with suppliers in order to assure quality 
standards and gradually suppliers gain capabilities through a process of “learning-by-doing.”  As the 
suppliers improve their capabilities, buyers (who are usually under intense competitive pressure) are more 
than willing to transfer a broader range of activities to the supplier.  Martin Bell, in his analysis of the 
footwear industry, suggests that buyers are careful to limit the potential for their suppliers to engage in 
design, branding, and marketing because they do not want to create their own competitors.  Humphrey 
and Schmitz argue that the form of governance within the chain, and in particular the nature of the 
linkages between firms within the chain, is a key determinant of the type of knowledge that is transmitted 
between firms.   
7 The firm-level data are from the Industrial Census provide detailed firm-level information for key 
economic variables such as output, sales, exports, etc., as well as information on ownership  In 2004, for   43
                                                                                                                                               
example, there were more than 1 million manufacturing firms.  Firm level data available for other years 
are for SOEs, and firms with sales larger than 5 million RMB. The trade data are at the 8-digit HS level, 
and have been aggregated to the 4-digit CIC level on the basis of a concordance we constructed between 
the two.  Thus, for each 4-digit CIC sector, we have information on:  1) Total manufacturing output, 
disaggregated between Chinese and FIEs; 2) total exports, disaggregated between Chinese firms and FIE; 
and, 3) total imports.  FIEs include both joint-ventures and wholly-owned subsidiaries. 
8 Along line segments AB, BC and CA, the markets are served exclusively by domestic firms and 
imports, FIEs and imports, and FIEs and domestic firms. 
9 At the 4-digit level, “vehicles” is made up of cars, buses and trucks, while CNC machine tools are 
included in “machine tools.”    
10 At the most basic level, manufacturing capability refers to the process skills that are necessary to 
transform inputs into outputs and is distinct from design and engineering capabilities.  The processes that 
would be included in manufacturing capability include:  supply chain management, production 
scheduling, quality control, trouble shooting to overcome problems encountered in manufacturing, and 
the ability to adapt processes to changing circumstances (Amsden 2001).  A firm with basic 
manufacturing capabilities will be able to utilize a design to manufacture a basic product, and as process 
technologies are upgraded it will increase the productivity of its operations and the quality of the product 
produced.  Design and engineering capabilities refer to a firm’s ability to adapt and develop the design for 
new products.  A firm with no design capabilities will utilize externally-acquired designs (and quality will 
be determined by the extent of its manufacturing capabilities).  As the firm gains design and engineering 
skills it will have an increased capability to alter and adapt products.  A firm with a high level of design 
and engineering capabilities will have the ability to develop its own products.     
11 For background on the Chinese auto industry, see Thun 2006. 
12 Foreign-investment in an automotive assembly JV continues to be limited to a 50% equity stake.  From 
the perspective of the Chinese government, there is thus less reason to discriminate against a JV, since 
they are at least 50% domestic.  Product design and technology come from the foreign partner. 
13 The data we draw on identify 8 market segments in China: Luxury, Executive, SUV, Minivan, Upper 
Medium, Lower Medium, Small and Mini.  Engine Displacement declines monotonically through the 
group from a high of 2.6 to a low of 0.9. To simplify slightly, we collapse the top two (luxury and 
executive), and the bottom two (small and mini) into single segments. 
14 Larger vehicles are also much more likely to have ABS braking systems and automatic transmissions.     44
                                                                                                                                               
15 We do not have an exact breakdown of FIE sales between the domestic and overseas markets.  The 
14.25 percent is calculated under the assumption that all of FIE’s sales were to the domestic market.  In 
2005, Caterpillar took a minority position in Shandong Equipment Manufacturer (SEM), and SEM 
accounts for half of the FIE share in 2006.  Similarly, Volvo acquired Lingong in 2007 and this increased 
the FIE share to slightly less than 25%.    
16 A lathe, the most important metal-cutting machine tool, spins a block of material to perform various 
operations such as cutting, sanding, drilling, etc. with tools that are applied to the work piece. In a 
machining center, by contrast, the piece of material remains fixed.  Multiple-spindle, multiple-axis 
machines also allow machining to be done as part of an integrated process as opposed to a series of 
discrete steps, thus saving time and often contributing to higher precision. 
17 At the first tier, other kinds of intermediates such as the integrated circuits used in the numerical control 
systems, or metal alloys continue to be imported or sourced from foreign firms. 
18 One advantage of this is that it has helped these suppliers achieve economies in production, and thus 
likely lowered costs. 
19 Estimates of changes in car prices are based on car models for which we have more than one year of 
data (40 models in all). The raw data were generously provided by the China Automotive Technology and 
Research Center (CATARC).  In general, trends in car prices are difficult to measure because of the 
introduction of  new car models, changes in "standard equipment," and changes in quality levels. We 
estimate a simple hedonic regression for car prices that allows us to control for car model and the 
standard equipment that is included in the sale price. 
20 The wheel loader product segment can be segmented according to product size and then again by price.  
In 2007, nearly 60% of the market was for 5 ton wheel loaders, 30% was for the 3 ton, and 10% was for 
the 8 ton. In the case of the 5 ton product, which has been the most rapidly growing market segment since 
the late 1990s, critical price points are 270,000 RMB and above (premier products), 230-270,000 (mid-
range products), and below 230,000 (low-end products). 
21 We make a similar assumption here about exports of FIEs as we do for wheel loaders, and that all 
exports were by Chinese firms. 
22 This is not always the case.  It is common for foreign manufacturers of construction equipment, for 
instance, to use more labor-intensive production processes.  As one multinational firm explained, the 
designs for their products are “robust” enough that they can be produced using either automated 
techniques or more labor-intensive approaches.  The strategy of the firm is to use imported equipment   45
                                                                                                                                               
only where it is absolutely essential to safety and performance.  Manual welding, for instance, was 
thought to produce “every bit as good” as results as were achieved by automated facilities in Japan.   “The 
economic formula in China is very different:  you don’t have to eliminate labour costs and the quality is 
equal (Interview 122107).” 
23 In many cases, OEM firms have pushed the responsibility for the design of components (and even 
entire modules) onto their global suppliers, and this makes “follow-sourcing” a necessity (Humphrey and 
Memedovic (2003). 
24 These calculations are based on the sample of FIEs in the National Bureau of Statistics’ annual firm-
level data that we matched with firm-level trade transactions data. 
25 Foreign managers in the 1990s sometimes spoke of “veneer localization.” A Tier 1 supplier was located 
in China, and thus conformed to Chinese regulations, but relied extensively on imported components.  
Japanese and Korean auto firms entered China relatively late, and they relied heavily on localization 
strategies of this sort (Thun 2006:  238-241). 
26 “Volkswagen Group in China:  Automaker bolsters localization of key components in China,” Fourin 
China Auto Weekly, January 7, 2008, p. 3.  
27 To give a simple example, quality tests at one stage of the manufacturing would be performed by a US 
$100,000 machine at the foreign firm and a visual inspection at a Chinese firm (Interview 083107).   
28 Firm A had achieved a local content percentage of 95% for drum brakes, and could meet the price of its 
closest Chinese competitor; it has achieved 90% for disc brakes, and its price was   
29 In order to get around the obstacle of a premium segment, one foreign firm producer developed a “de-
featured” excavator in 1998-1999, but the feedback from consumers was that it looked “cheap” and the 
firm abandoned the effort.  Interview 122107. 
30 Labor input measured in hours was higher in China, but this was more than offset by the lower wages. 
31 In the case of a foreign firm making braking systems, for example, design changes to the caliper 
reduced the complexity of the machining that was required, and thus the type of CNC machines that 
suppliers need to use.  This allowed the foreign firm to significantly increase local sourcing.     
32 Chery provides an example of this dynamic.  The QQ, the model that was the key to its rapid rise, is 
often used by foreign firms as an example of IPR violations.  A Chinese version of the story is that the 
key designer on the project, Ni Shaoyong, developed a mini-car at Dongfeng-Citroen, but was so 
frustrated by the limited power of a local designer to push a project within a JV structure that he moved   46
                                                                                                                                               
with 14 colleagues to Chery’s home-base of Wuhu and started a design firm that worked under contract 
for Chery.  Liu Tao, “China’s Auto Design:  Paths and Dreams,” China Entrepreneur, 20 January 2007.    47
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Table 1: Domestic Output and Market Shares 





























1995  5440.0  1147.8  1143.6  5435.8   67.7  11.3  21 
                 
2004  19362.1  5460.1  4516.1  18418.1   56  19.1  24.9 
               
  Construction Equipment 
1995  11.3  0.8  2.9  13.5   73.0  4.9  22.0 
               
2004  59.7  4.2  13.8  69.3   59.8  20.4  19.5 
                   
  Vehicles 
1995  106.9  1  8.2  114.2   64.2  26.6  7.2 
                    
2004  562.6  5.1  39.1  596.6   37.3  56.1  6.6 
               
  Machine Tool 
1995  10.4  1.7  14.1  22.8   36.8  1.4  61.8 
                   
2004  36.6  5.3  50.1  81.5   33.5  5.0  61.5 
               
                          
               
















  WL  EX  WL  EX  WL  EX  WL  EX  WL  EX  WL  EX  WL  EX 
1997             17,404   3293             15,704   9202           1,164   6623           2,863   714     7.41  71.97    
1998             17,254   4238             17,296   8753              431   4728              389   213     2.49  54.02    
1999             18,819   5988             18,991   7434              438   1602              266   156     2.31  21.55    
2000             20,857   7926             20,748   9034              297   1333              406   225     1.43  14.76    
2001             26,352   12397             26,076   13451              217   1624              493   50     0.83  12.07    
2002             43,348   19710             42,693   22259              287   2886              942   337     0.67  12.97    
2003             69,666   33982             69,723   61392              441   28200              384   790     0.63  45.93    
2004             91,334   33614             90,985   48848              568   18673              917   2874    0.62  38.23    
2005           107,354   33862           103,620   48040              396   18017           4,130   3839    0.38  37.50    
2006           129,834   49625           120,946   70018              469   28397           9,357   8004  14.25  54.42  0.39  40.56  85.36 5.03 
                                            
                          
Source : 1997‐2006:  China Construction Machinery Industry Yearbook, 2007, pp. 10‐12.             53
 
Table 3: Top 10 Wheel Loader and Excavator Manufacturers in China, 2006 
         
  Wheel Loaders   Excavators 
Rank  Firm    Sales   Firm    Sales 
   # of units    # of units 
            
1  Liugong (D)  20,193   Sumitomo (F)  8,354 
2  Longgong (D)  20,016   Komatsu (F)  6,891 
3  Xiamen gongcheng jixie (D)  16,734   Hitachi (F)  4,955 
4  Lingong (D)  14,273   Cat (F)  4,477 
5  Xuzhou gongcheng jixie (D)  9,222   Hyundai (F)  3,440 
6  Shandong shangong (F)  8,049   Hyundai (F)  3,155 
7  Chengdu shengang gongcheng jixie (F)  7,230   Guangxi wanglin (D)  3,426 
8  Changlin (DE)  6,374   Chengdu shengang (D)  2,923 
9  Shandong futian zhonggong (D)  5,159   Shandong fulin (D)  2,107 
10  Zhongguo yila jituan (D)  4,385   Zhongguo yila jituan (D)  1,734 
          
All Firms   129,834    49,625 
          
Of which:    Foreign  17,235   Foreign  38,102 
         
            




                
         
Source:  China Construction Industry Yearbook, 2007.        54
Table 4: Production, Consumption, Trade and Pricing of Metal Cutting Machine tools, 1997‐2006 
              
       1997  2000  2003  2006 
PHYSICAL UNITS            
                  
Production     9,051  14,053  36,813  85,756 
                 
Consumption     15,200  23,480  52,383  107,482 
              
Imports       6,200  11,155  23,320  33,693 
              
Exports       965  1,728  2,840  11,967 
            
VALUE TOTALS (US$ Billion)          
              
Sales of Domestic Producers   0.22  0.49  0.74  2.74 
              
Consumption     0.74  1.27  2.87  7.00 
                
  Imports       0.54  0.81  2.18  4.47 
              
  Exports       0.02  0.03  0.06  0.28 
              
              
Market Share of Imports (% of Sales)   73.3  64.1  76.0  63.9 
Market Share of Imports (% of Units)  40.8  47.5  44.5  31.3 
              
Unit Value CNC Imports ($US)   87,419  72,972  93,396  132,669   55
Unit Value CNC Exports ($US)   22,798  19,676  19,366  23,063 
Unit Value of CNC domestic sales by domestic 
producers  24,363  36,998  20,297  33,352 
              
Ratio of unit values of Import:Export  3.8  3.7  4.8  5.8 
Ratio of unit values of Import: Domestic Sales  3.6  2.0  4.6  4.0 
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Table 5: Domestic Consumption of Machining Centers, 2005 
                            
   Quantity   Value (Billion $US)    
Average 
Price  
Type   Total  Imported  Domestic 
% 
Imported   Total  Imported  Domestic % Imported  Imported  Domestic   Ratio 
                            
Vertical   11625  8133  3492  0.70   0.823  0.637  0.186  0.77     78,323  53,265  1.47 
Horizontal  1950  1326  624  0.68   0.544  0.460  0.084  0.85   346,908  134,615  2.58 
Plano   600  295  305  0.49   0.215  0.123  0.092  0.57   416,949  301,639  1.38 
Other   825  589  236  0.71   0.088  0.078  0.010  0.89   132,428  42,373  3.13 
                               
Total   15000  10343  4657  0.69   1.67  1.298  0.372  0.78   125,496  79,880  1.57 
                                            
                          
Source:  China Machine Tool and Tool Industry Yearbook, 2006, pg. 222.             
 
 




























-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Change in Market Share
Figure 2: Change in Chinese Firms' Domestic Market Share, 1995-2004
 
 Source: Based on data from the 1995 and 2004 Industrial Census and UN Comtrade  
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Figure 3: Changes in Domestic Market Share of Chinese Firms
 
 
Source:  See Figure 2. 
  
Figure 4:  Market Segments in the Construction Equipment Sector 


























































Luxury Upper Med SUV Mini Van Lower Med Small-Mini
20002006 20002006 20002006 20002006 20002006 20002006
Figure 5: Car Production in China by Market Segment and Ownership
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  Source:  Author survey of OEMs (6 foreign and 2 Chinese) in China.   
 
 




 Source: Internal Analysis of Leading Multinational Construction Equipment  
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  Source: China Machine Tool and Tool Industry Yearbook, 2006 and 2008. 
 